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We study an economy where the lack of a simultaneous double coincidence of wants creates the need
for a relatively safe asset (money). We show that, even in the absence of asymmetric information or
an agency problem, the private provision of liquidity is inefficient. The reason is that liquidity affects
prices and the welfare of others, and creators do not internalize this. This distortion is present even
if we introduce lending and government money. To eliminate the inefficiency the government must
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 1. Introduction 
Historically, one of the primary functions of the banking sector has been to create means of 
payment (“money like” liabilities) either in the form of bank notes (private money) or credit. Yet 
most models of banking focus on other aspects, such as risk sharing or monitoring. Less attention 
has been paid to the role of banks in creating liquidity for transactions purposes and how this 
interacts with the government’s role in this area. Does a competitive banking sector generate the 
socially optimal amount of the means of payment? How does the liquidity created by the banking 
sector affect the equilibrium level of goods and asset prices? Does the degree of competition in 
the banking sector affect the amount of liquidity created and hence the level of prices?  
In this paper we try to answer these questions. We show that, even in the absence of 
asymmetric information or an agency problem, the amount of liquidity generated by the banking 
sector is inefficient. A competitive banking sector generates an excessive quantity of means of 
payment, while a monopolistic one a scarcity. The distortion arises from two externalities the 
creation of money has in general equilibrium:  more money increases the equilibrium prices of 
the goods that those with the money buy; but it also increases the wealth of the agents supplying 
these goods and so the prices of the goods they will buy. These externalities are pecuniary in 
nature but unlike standard pecuniary externalities they have welfare consequences.  
A competitive bank, which ignores the externality imposed on other buyers, will generate too 
much liquidity. A monopolistic bank that serves the buyers, and ignores the welfare of the 
sellers, generates too little liquidity. There is one intermediate level of competition that generates 
the efficient amount of liquidity but it would be fortuitous for the economy to end up there. 
We start by assuming that future income (be it labor income or investment income) is not 
pledgeable (or contractible). Eventually, however, we relax this assumption, requiring only that 
human capital is inalienable and a worker can quit at any time.     
 In such a world we are able to show that transactional needs create a demand for relatively 
safe assets (liquidity). The intuition is that transactional needs generate a form of risk aversion 
even in risk neutral people. When an agent has the opportunity/desire to buy, having twice as 
much pledgeable wealth in some states does not compensate her for the risk of having half as 
much in other states, because in the latter states she is wealth constrained. As a result, agents are 
willing to hold relatively safe assets even if they have a lower yield.   3 
 
We analyze these issues in a simple economy consisting of two groups of agents: doctors and 
builders. Doctors buy building services from builders and then builders buy doctors’ services 
from doctors, or the other way round. Agents are also endowed with wheat. There is a lack of a 
simultaneous double coincidence of wants: each builder requires a doctor at a different date and 
typically one with different skills from the doctor he is building for, and vice versa for builders. 
Since future income is not pledgeable this generates a need for liquidity. Wheat is costly to carry 
and can easily rot, so banks arise in our model as depositary institutions, which store wheat and 
issue notes. An alternative to depositing wheat in a bank is to invest it in higher return activities 
that take place outside the banking sector. Initially, we suppose that the returns from these 
activities are not pledgeable. 
      For much of the paper we simply assume that low return activities inside the banking 
sector are pledgeable and that high return activities outside are not. Later we delve more deeply 
into what determines whether an asset’s return can be collateralized for the purposes of liquidity. 
We start by studying the effect of the supply of notes on equilibrium prices and on social 
welfare when banks are purely passive institutions that “notify” all deposits, i.e., an agent who 
deposits a unit of wheat receives a note of equal value. In notifying the deposits of a doctor who 
buys building services before he sells doctors services, a bank imposes a negative externality on 
doctors in the same position at other banks: raising the amount of money increases the price of 
building services, which is bad for them since they consume these services. Because of this 
externality too much wheat endowment is stored to create liquidity instead of being invested in 
socially productive activities.   
The distortion in liquidity that we identify is present even when banks can control the 
notification process, as long as they act in a competitive way. A monopolistic bank, in contrast, 
ends up under-producing money; this is the standard result that a profit maximizing monopolist 
restricts production. We show that the distortion is robust to the introduction of lending and 
government money. We introduce government money by supposing that the government can 
impose sales taxes and that agents can pay these sales taxes with government notes.      
While the introduction of government money potentially crowds out the need for private money, 
government money is costly to the extent that sales taxes impose deadweight losses.  
As noted, in most of the paper we take the distinction between collateralizable and non-
collateralizable assets as exogenous. In Section 6 we go into this more deeply. Suppose that 4 
 
activities that earn a higher expected return are also riskier. Assume that the returns from these 
activities are positively correlated and that uncertainty about them is resolved before trading 
takes place. Then a high return realization provides large amounts of liquidity for the economy, 
while a low return realization provides low amounts of liquidity. However, since there are 
diminishing returns to liquidity—the value of liquidity falls to zero when the gains from trade 
have been exhausted—this induces the equivalent of risk aversion in agents: the yield on the high 
return asset is discounted in the good state, and as a result the safe asset is favored for liquidity 
purposes.  Given this interpretation of the model our main result is that an unregulated market 
economy allocates an excessive amount of resources to assets whose returns are stable.  
Our paper is related to two literatures: that on banking and that on money. Much of the 
banking literature is concerned with the role played by banks and the need for bank regulation 
(see, for example, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)). One branch of the banking literature, starting 
with Diamond (1984) and continuing with Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), focuses on the asset 
side of banks: their role in monitoring loans.  Another branch of the literature, starting with 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), focuses on the liability side of banks: the ability of banks to 
provide risk sharing in the face of liquidity needs (Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Allen and Gale 
(1998) and (2007), and Bhattacharya and Gale (1987)), or to reduce future adverse selection 
(Gorton and Pennacchi (1990)).  There are also some papers, such as Diamond and Rajan (2001), 
which try to integrate the two sides, showing how demand deposits are critical in making 
credible the ability of lenders to extract a repayment for their loans.   
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and (2011) focus on moral hazard on the side of suppliers 
of liquidity, rather than on the side of users. They show that, in the presence of aggregate 
uncertainty, the state power to tax future income creates liquidity for the corporate sector, 
improving its ability to invest.    
In all these papers the source of friction is either some informational asymmetry or some 
agency problem (or both).  While these problems are important, they are not the only ones 
relevant for banks. One reason banks are unique is that they issue liabilities that are used as a 
means of payment. Our goal is to analyze the implications of this role. For this reason, we 
abstract from all the other frictions and focus on the externalities in the creation of money. A 
general theory of banking would bring all these frictions together. 5 
 
A recent strand of the banking literature, which deals with the transactional role of 
deposits, introduces behavioral features. This strand derives the uniqueness of banks from the 
misperception by depositors that their claims are safe (Gennaioli et al. (2010), Rotemberg 
(2010)) or from the banks’ ability to arbitrage irrationally exuberant markets and rationally 
priced deposits (Shleifer and Vishny (2010)).  We do not introduce behavioral aspects here.  
Our result that the creation of inside money is excessive is similar to Stein (2011). In his 
model, however, it is assumed that agents have a discontinuous demand for a riskless claim 
(money). Similarly, his inefficiency arises from an assumed friction in the financial markets (that 
patient investors cannot raise additional money), while ours arises endogenously. Stein’s model, 
however, is richer in terms of implications for monetary policy. In this respect, the two models 
can be seen as complementary. Our results are also related to those in chapter 7 of Holmstrom 
and Tirole (2011). They show that investors tend to hold an excessive amount of liquidity to take 
advantage of potential firesales. Our model shows that this excess of liquidity is not specific to 
the storage role of money; it applies also to its transactional role.    
Our paper is also related to the huge literature on money. Much of this literature is 
concerned with the role money plays in general equilibrium (e.g., Hahn (1965)).  To create such 
a role, one needs to dispense with the traditional Walrasian auctioneer and explicitly introduce an 
exchange process.  Ostroy and Starr (1990) provide an excellent survey of attempts in this 
direction.  As far as we can tell, none of these attempts analyze the externality we identify in our 
paper. The role money plays in our model (i.e., to address the lack of double coincidence of 
wants) is similar to that in Kyotaki and Wright (1989). Their focus, however, is on what goods 
can become money and how. Our focus is to what extent private banks can provide the efficient 
quantity of medium of exchange.   Another large part of the literature on money analyzes the role 
of inside money on monetary policy, as in Brunnermaier and Sannikov (2010), Diamond and 
Rajan (2006), and Kashyap and Stein (2004). Our model is silent on this. 
Our approach resembles that of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and (2002).  Like us, they 
rely on some limited pledgeability of future income. Their main focus, however, is on the 
multiplier/contagion effect that the failure of one intermediary can have on the overall system. 
Our paper, instead, is concerned with externalities in the creation of liquidity.   
Finally, our approach is close to that of Mattesini et al (2009). They study banking using 
the tools of mechanism design. They consider an economy with two groups of consumers who 6 
 
want to trade with each other. As in our model, there is a timing problem: the first group has to 
buy from the second group before they have sold their own output. Mattesini et al (2009) analyze 
how claims on deposits with third parties are a better means of exchange than claims on 
individual wealth. They study the social optimum but not the market equilibrium. In contrast, we 
take the superiority of third party deposits as given, and study the divergence between the market 
equilibrium and the social optimum.  
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the framework and 
describe the Walrasian equilibrium. In Section 3 we analyze the effect of the introduction of 
banks as storage facilities. In Section 4 we introduce the possibility of bank lending. In Section 5 
we study the interaction between private money and government money. In Section 6 we 
consider some extensions, while in section 7 we discuss the implications this paper has for the 
nature of money. Conclusions follow.  
 
2. The Framework  
We consider an economy that lasts three periods: 
  
   1 ----------------------------------------2----------------------------------------3 
 
       There are two types of agents in equal numbers: doctors and builders. The doctors want to 
consume building services and the builders want to consume doctor services. Doctors and 
builders can consume wheat in any period and there is no discounting. Both doctors and builders 
have an endowment of wheat in period 1 equal to e. As will become clear we will assume that e 
is “large”. 








bbb b Ux d l   
where  i x is the sum of the quantities of wheat consumed by individual  , id b   in each period;  d b  
is the quantity of building services consumed by the doctors;  d l  is the labor supplied by the 
doctors;  b d  is the quantity of doctor services consumed by the builders; and  b l  is the labor 7 
 
supplied by the builders. We assume constant returns to scale: one unit of builder labor yields 
one unit of building services and one unit of doctor labor yields one unit of doctor services. We 
normalize the price of wheat to be 1 in all periods. Let  b p and  d p be the price respectively of 
building and doctor services.  In words, doctors and builders have a constant marginal utility of 
wheat, a constant marginal utility of the service provided by the other group of agents, and a 
quadratic disutility of labor. 
In period 1 each agent learns whether he will first buy or sell. Ex ante both events are 
equally likely. For convenience, we assume that in the east side of town doctors buy builders’ 
services in period 2, while builders buy doctors’ services in period 3. In the west side of town, 
the order is reversed. After each agent learns whether he will first buy or sell (equivalently, 
whether he is in the east or west side of town), he can invest part of his wheat endowment in a 
project that pays off at the end of period 3 (in the form of wheat), and whose return is R >1; the 
rest of the endowment is (costlessly) stored. For the moment we take the return from the 
investment project to be perfectly certain. The investment opportunity is specific to the agent.   
We have deliberately set up the model to be very symmetric; this helps with the welfare 
comparisons later. 
In periods 2 and 3 the market meets and the doctors and builders trade in the order 
determined in period 1. Throughout the paper we will analyze the east part of town, where 
doctors buy in period 2 and builders in period 3; the reverse case is completely symmetrical.   
We assume there are many doctors and many builders, and so the prices for both services 
are determined competitively. It is crucial for our analysis that there is no simultaneous double 
coincidence of wants: builders and doctors are in either the market for buying or the market for 
selling: they cannot do both at the same time. Hence, even if the builder a doctor buys from 
wants the doctor services from his customer, he cannot buy them at the same time as he is selling 
building services. 
 
2.1 A benchmark: the Walrasian equilibrium  
              In an ideal world the doctors could pledge to pay the builders out of income from 
supplying doctor services that they will earn in period 3 and from the return from their 
investment project. This is the assumption made in classic Walrasian or Arrow-Debreu theory 
and it is easy to compute the Walrasian equilibrium.  8 
 
  Clearly both the doctors and the builders invest all their endowment in the investment 
project since this maximizes their wealth; and under complete markets maximizing wealth is a 
necessary condition for maximizing utility. Thus, a doctor solves the following maximization 
problem: 
 (2.1)                          Max 
2 1
2
dd d x bl    
                                   S.T.     db d d d xp b p le R  . 
The solution is  
(2.2)       dd l p          if    1 b p   





      if    1 b p     
 
    0 d b                                   if    1 b p   



















              if  1 b p   
The intuition is that, if 1 b p  , doctors prefer wheat to building services, if  1 b p   they are 
indifferent, and, if 1 b p  , they prefer building services. The marginal utility of wealth for doctors 
is 1 if  1 b p   and 
1
b p
if 1 b p  , and this affects their labor supply decision. If  1 b p  , doctors 
choose labor supply to maximize 
2 1
2










  Similarly, a builder solves: 
(2.3)                          Max 
2 1
2
bb b x dl    
                                   S.T.     bd bb b x pd pl e R   . 
The solution is  
(2.4)       bb l p          if    1 d p   9 
 





      if    1 d p     
 
    0 b d                                   if    1 d p   


















                 if  1 d p   
Again the marginal utility of wealth for builders is 1 if  1 d p   and 
1
d p
if  1 d p  .  
  For markets to clear we must have  
 
(2.5)                 db bl            
   
(2.6)   bd dl   
 
On the one hand, (2.5) and (2.6) cannot be satisfied if either  1 b p   or 1 d p   (demand will be 
less than supply for building/doctor services, respectively). On the other hand, we cannot have 
both  1 b p   and 1 d p   because then the demand for wheat would be zero, while the supply is 
eR  ((2.5) and (2.6) imply that the wheat market clears). Hence, either  1 b p  and  1 d p  , or 
1 b p  ,  1 d p   , or  1 bd pp  . It is easily seen that the first case is inconsistent with (2.5) and 
the second with (2.6).  
  We are left with 1 bd pp  . It is immediate that (2.2)-(2.6) hold if  1 db bd bldl   .  
Hence, we have established  
Proposition 1: In the unique Walrasian equilibrium all wheat is invested 
and 1 bd d bb d ppbldl     . The utilities of the doctors and builders are 
1
2
d Ue R  , 
1
2
b Ue R  , respectively, and total welfare (social surplus) equals  21 db WU U e R    .                      10 
 
             Note that the Walrasian allocation and prices are independent of the initial endowment e 
and R  (except for consumption of wheat, which varies one to one with eR ). Also the Walrasian 
equilibrium achieves maximal social surplus; this follows from the first theorem of welfare 
economics and the symmetry of the parties. In what follows we will refer to the Walrasian 
equilibrium allocation as the first best. 
 
3. Introducing Banks 
          We now suppose that parties cannot pledge their future labor income or investment 
income—the returns from these activities can be diverted or hidden. We also assume that it is 
impossible for individuals to carry wheat around with them when they trade; it is too 
cumbersome or the wheat would rot or be stolen. In the absence of any further assumption the 
model now becomes trivial. Trade between doctors and builders is impossible—they have 
nothing to trade with— and so each agent invests and eats his wheat in period 3. We have 
d Ue R  and  b Ue R  .  
             However, we now introduce storage facilities. These storage facilities are perfectly 
secure in the sense that wheat deposited at a facility in period 1 will remain there and be intact at 
the end of period 3.   
           Storage per se does not change anything since there is no advantage to doctors from 
storing wheat rather than consuming it right away. However, let us suppose that claims can be 
issued on the wheat deposited in a storage facility.  In particular, if a doctor deposits f units of 
wheat he will receive f notes, where each note is a claim on a unit of wheat at the end of period 
3; he can then use these notes to pay builders. The builders in turn can use these notes to pay 
doctors. At the end of period 3 the holders of the notes can go to the storage facility and redeem 
them for an equal number of units of wheat.  We call these storage facilities banks. At the 
moment, these are completely passive institutions, which just store and issue notes on a one-for-
one basis.  
 
3.1 Individual optimization   
Let’s consider first the doctors.  In period 1, a doctor invests  d ef  units of wheat in the 
investment project and deposits d f  units of wheat in the bank, receiving d f  in notes. In period 2 11 
 









dd d pl l  , i.e., set  dd l p  . Note that it is too late for the doctor to buy more building 





. A doctor’s labor yields 
revenue 
2
d p  in the form of notes, which he redeems for wheat at the end of period 3; in addition 
he incurs an effort cost of  
2 1
2
d p , and so his net utility is 
2 1
2
d p . Finally, he will also receive and 
consume the payoff from his investment in the form of wheat.  
Therefore, a doctor’s (expected) utility when he buys first is 
 










   .    
 
Each doctor chooses  d f  to maximize (3.1), taking prices as given. The first order condition for 
an interior solution is  






Similarly, a builder’s utility is     
 


















 , since she will use her income to buy 
doctor services. We shall see shortly that builders will be a corner, so their first order condition is   







3.2 Market Equilibrium  12 
 
We solve for the equilibrium under the conjecture that  0 b f  . Since only 0 d f  , we will 
drop the subscript and set d f f  . We also conjecture that  d p and  b p  are less than one. In due 
course we will show that these conjectures are correct. 
We work backwards, starting with the market for doctors in period 3. After the doctors 
have bought building services, the builders find themselves with a quantity  f of notes. Hence, 




.The supply of doctor services is   
(3.4)      dd l p  . 
 
 Hence, market clearing requires 
 






Similarly, the market-clearing condition in the building services market is   












 . Combining this with (3.5) yields  
(3.7)                                     
1
2, d pf 
3
4
b pf  . 
 
Substituting the equilibrium price into (3.2) we have: 
 





or       







where we assume that e is larger than  ˆ f , so the solution is not at the corner. Since R >1,  ˆ f  <1, 
which implies 1> db p p  . Hence (3.3) holds as an inequality and the builders will be at a corner 
solution with  0 b f  , as initially conjectured.  














  In other words trade levels are lower than in the Walrasian equilibrium. (Recall that 
in the Walrasian equilibrium  d p = b p =1 and one unit of each service is traded.) 
Proposition 2: If R >1 and e > ˆ f , there is less trade and prices are lower in the market 
equilibrium when agents cannot pledge future income than in the Walrasian equilibrium. 
 
3.3 Social Optimum  
Obviously the market equilibrium is not first best optimal given that it operates below the 
Walrasian equilibrium level of trade. We now show that the market equilibrium is also not 
second best optimal: a planner operating under the same constraints as the market can do better. 
Recall that ex ante it is not known who will buy first: doctors or builders. Thus the expected 
utility
 






.The social optimum is obtained by maximizing  d U +  b U  
taking into account the effect of f on prices.  
    
                 That is, the planner maximizes 
 





f ffe f R e R     . 
The first order condition is  
 






  . 
 
Comparing the left-hand side of (3.8) and (3.10) we have  
Proposition 3: If R >1 and e > ˆ f , the market equilibrium leads to an excessive amount of private 
money f, and an excessive trade level, relative to the second best social optimum.        14 
 
Proof: Since the l.h.s. of both (3.8) and (3.10) are decreasing in f, to prove that the solution of 










 . This 
can be rewritten as 
33 1
44 2 11




  , which is true as long as  1 f  . When f=1, 
the inequality becomes an equality. Trade levels are higher in the market equilibrium since 
equilibrium trade levels, given by 
1
2 f  for doctor services and 
1
4 f  for building services, are 
monotonically increasing in f .    
  The social and private returns from varying  f are illustrated in Figure 1.  
                                                             [Figure 1 here] 
There are two types of inefficiency. With respect to the Walrasian equilibrium, there is too little 
trade but at the same time too much wheat is invested in liquidity-creating unproductive storage 
instead of productive projects. This inefficiency is due to the lack of pledgeabilty of future 
income. In the Walrasian equilibrium there is no liquidity problem since future (labor) income 
can be pledged and so no wheat is invested in unproductive storage.  In addition, there is an 
inefficiency with respect to the second best. The creation of more means of payments imposes a 
positive externality on the builders (who see the price of their building services go up) and a 
negative externality on the other doctors (who see the price of what they are buying go up). In 
standard models the effect of these “pecuniary” externalities is second order and thus does not 
create a divergence between social and private optimality. Here, however, while the positive 
externality on other builders is second order, the negative externality on other doctors is first 
order, since the doctors are liquidity constrained. (The builders who sell before they buy are not 
liquidity constrained.) Thus the market equilibrium yields too much liquidity and too much trade 
relative to the second best, even though too little trade relative to the first best. 
  Notice that if R =1, the social and private solutions do not differ: they are both 1 f  ( as 
long as  1 e  ). In this case the first best is achieved. There is still a divergence between private 
and social incentives, but this divergence is infra-marginal.   
  As we have noted, as long as 1 R  , the economy will operate below the Walrasian 
equilibrium level of trade, regardless of the quantity of endowment e. Because high return 
projects cannot be collateralized, and the only investments that can be collateralized (wheat 15 
 
storage) have a lower yield, there is an opportunity cost of creating liquidity.  Thus the optimal 
amount of liquidity is too low from a first best efficiency point of view: in the first best there 
would be enough liquidity to generate a trade of one unit of each service.  This conclusion is 
reminiscent of Friedman (1969)’s famous result that with a non-negative rate of inflation people 
hold too little money. In Friedman, however, this inefficiency is in the form of a shoe-leather 
cost; here it is in the form of missed trading opportunities. The ultimate source of inefficiency in 
our paper is lack of pledgeability: the inefficiency would disappear if all labor income could be 
pledged or if the return from the non-collateralizeable investments were equal to 1.  
  
3.4 Overproduction of collateral 
In our model there are three types of activities: non-collateralizeable investments (high 
return projects), collateralizeable investments (low return storage), and future labor income. 
Interestingly, it would be natural to think that if future labor income is contractible, the 
inefficiency would disappear. In Section 4 we show this is not the case.   










, since they can be used both to produce R  in period 3 and to buy goods 





  . This conclusion can be generalized: assets that can be 
collateralized to back credit will trade at a higher price than otherwise identical assets that cannot 
be collateralized to produce credit. As a result, if we add an early period where effort is exerted 
to produce various assets, there will be an overproduction of assets that can be collateralized to 
produce liquidity (Madrigan and Philippon, 2011). Therefore, there will be excess resources 
invested in collateralizeable assets and/or an overproduction of low-yielding assets that can be 
collateralized to produce liquidity, a result similar to the one Madrigan and Philippon (2011) 
obtain for houses. 
   
4. Bank Lending 
Let’s now consider the case where banks have some ability to seize payments that go through the 
banking sector. Specifically, suppose that all payments for building and doctor services take 
place through check transfers and that the bank is able to seize these before they are cashed for 16 
 
consumption. In other words, labor income is now contractible. However, a bank cannot force 
anyone to work: human capital is inalienable (as in Hart and Moore (1994)). That is, all a bank 
can do is to ensure that someone who defaults has zero consumption, apart from their investment 
income. 
            We continue to assume that investment income cannot be seized. In Section 6.1 we show 
that with a different timing of the model this assumption can be relaxed. 
  Given that doctors go first, only doctors will want to borrow. Builders, who buy second, 
will obtain no advantage from borrowing. A bank, knowing that it will have no power over 
builders at the end of period 3, will insist on being repaid before it approves the builders’ 
payment to doctors. But then builders will have to repay their debt before they buy doctors’ 
services, making their borrowing useless. 
Let   be the amount borrowed by each doctor. By borrowing  an amount   an 
individual doctor can consume 
b p

 of building services, which is attractive if he has to pay back 




d p   of effort, receiving in exchange 
2
d p  in terms of payment. His net utility is 
2 1
2
d p  . Thus, he cannot borrow more than
2 1
2
d p : if he did he would prefer not to work in period 3, 
default, and consume nothing (except for his investment income).  
            A doctor’s utility is now given by 












  . 
Notice that given 1 b p  , a doctor’s utility is increasing in  ; thus a doctor will borrow up to the 
constraint.  














 . 17 
 




d pf      
or  
    
(4.2)                f   . 
Hence,  
   
1
2 (2 ) d p f         and             
3
4 (2 ) b p f  . 
From (3.2) the FOC in a competitive market is  
(4.3)                                          
3




     4
3






where  ˆ f  is the solution of (3.8) when there was no borrowing and  ˆ ˆ f is the solution of (4.3) 
when there is borrowing. Since  2 ˆ ˆ f = ˆ f , it follows that the presence of lending keeps prices 
constant. However, lending cuts in half the amount of wheat that is notified, reducing welfare 
losses, since more can be invested productively. Without lending e -  ˆ f  is invested in the risky 
project, while with lending, the investment rises to 
ˆ ˆ ef  .    
  It is easy to see that  ˆ ˆˆ () () dd Uf Uf  , since  
2





Uf p ef R
p
 
   β 
and         
                          
11 1
44 4 11 ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ( 2 )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22
d f ef R f e f R f f ef RUf        . 
Similarly, we have that  
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The planning solution is obtained by maximizing the sum of the utilities of a doctor and a builder 













      . 
Substituting the value of d p and  b p , we obtain  
11
42 1
(2 ) ( ) (2 )
2
Wfe f R f    . 
Thus, the FOC is  
 
(4.4)                      
31
42 11




  . 
By comparing (4.3) and (4.4) we have 
 
Proposition 4: If R >1, the market equilibrium leads to an excessive amount of private money 
even in the presence of lending. Lending, however, increases welfare.  
Proof:  Since the l.h.s. of both (4.3) and (4.4) are decreasing in f, to prove that the solution of 
(4.3) is larger than the solution of (4.4) it is enough to show that 
33 1
44 2 11







42 (2 ) (2 ) f f

 , which is always true since 21 f  by (4.3). 
  Lending, thus, does not resolve the tension between private and social objectives. 
Nevertheless, lending does improve welfare since it increases the volume of trade without 
sacrificing the higher return of the alternative investment. Interestingly, lending is not a perfect 
substitute for the notification of wheat. To see why, look at equation (4.2). The amount of 
feasible lending is directly related to the amount of notes present in the system. The reason is that 
lending faces a repayment constraint. With no notes in the system, the amount borrowed by 
doctors equals the purchasing power in the hands of builders, which in turn equals the revenue 
received by doctors for their services. But if the revenue equals the debt, it is not in the interest 
of the doctors to work, given that they have to exert costly effort. Hence, the doctors will default. 
To have a functioning lending market, we need a minimum amount of deposits.   19 
 
  Finally, it is important to emphasize that we have only scratched the surface of 
borrowing. If we introduce uncertainty in the proceeds from trade, then borrowing will be risky. 
(In principle it could be state-contingent.) Some loans may not be repaid, which might cause 
some banks not to be able to honor their claims. This may lead to contagion effects, as 
consumers cannot redeem claims and in turn default, leading other banks to default. (Contagion 
effects are analyzed in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), (2002).) The analysis becomes much more 
complex, and richer, and we hope to explore the consequences in future work. 
 
5.  Interaction between private and public money   
  So far we have ignored any role of the government in providing liquidity. In this finite 
horizon economy, to introduce government money we need to specify why it is accepted. 
Following a long tradition (e.g., Cochrane (1998)), we assume that government money is 
valuable because one can pay taxes with it. We suppose that each agent receives an amount m of 
government money in period 2 after investments have been made but before any trading takes 
place, and will have to pay some taxes in period 3. We assume that the agent has an option to pay 
taxes either in dollars or an equal number of units of wheat. This anchors the value of money.   
In this type of model, it is generally assumed that taxation takes the form of a non-
distortionary lump sum tax. What is ignored is that even a lump sum tax has some potential 
distortions. What happens if an individual refuses to pay the lump sum tax?  Presumably, he 
would be thrown in jail. To make this a credible threat, however, the government would have to 
build prisons in advance, which is in itself distortionary.    
  Rather than working with a lump sum tax and a jail threat (the results are similar but less 
elegant), we prefer to use a standard model of a distortionary tax, such as a consumption tax. 
Specifically, we assume that the government can impose a mill tax on those who turn wheat into 
flour.  
  Assume that each agent can obtain  units of flour in period 3 at the cost of 
2 1
2
c units of 
wheat. This activity occurs at facilities that can easily be monitored by the government, and so 
the sales tax cannot be avoided. One unit of flour yields one unit of utility. An agent’s utility is 











bbb b b b Ux d l t c        
where t is the tax rate on flour.   
   We assume that this transformation from wheat into flour can be financed out of the 
return from the investment. We suppose that this return is always high enough so that agents are 
not at a corner solution, and so d  ,  b  satisfy the first order condition 








Hence, budget balance for the government implies  






5.1 No private borrowing  
For simplicity let’s start with the case where there is no private borrowing. Consider the market 
for doctors. The number of notes in the hands of builders will be f+m (from trading with doctors) 
plus m of their own.  Thus, market equilibrium is given by  









We assume that 2 1 fm   ; otherwise (5.3) would be replaced by  d p  =1. 
              On the other hand, in the market for builders the number of notes available to doctors is 
f+m, so the market equilibrium is given by  







Solving (5.3) and (5.4) yields  
 (5.5)     
1
2 (2 ) d p fm         and             
11
24 () ( 2 ) b p fm f m   . 
 
We can write the utilities of doctors and builders as  
(5.6)      
22 11
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     
where we use (5.1) to substitute for d  ,  b  .  
  The competitive equilibrium is characterized by the first order condition of (5.6) with 
respect to f, where prices are taken as given:  






As noted we require the solution to (5.5) and (5.7) to satisfy  21 fm   for these formulae to be  
correct. This will be true as long as m is not too large. We assume this in what follows. 
             In contrast, the planner maximizes  db WU U    taking into account the effects of f and 
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  Several questions are worth asking. First, starting at the competitive equilibrium, does the 
planner want to introduce outside money, i.e., 0 m  , given that the market will adjust to a new 
competitive equilibrium? The answer seems to be ambiguous, perhaps because the market 
provides too much of its own money (sets f too high).  
  A second question is: given that the planner can regulate f, does she want to set  0 m  ? 
Here the answer is affirmative. To see this, set f at the regulatory optimum, i.e., maximize W 
with respect to f when   0 m   (this is equivalent to maximizing (3.9)). Now consider a small 
change in m (or equivalently in t). By the envelope theorem,  
(5.10) 
11 1 3 1 1
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at  0 m  , and so  








     22 
 
since (5.5) and (5.8) imply 1 f   when  0 m   (given  1 R  ). It follows that it is always better for 
the planner to set  0 m   than 0 m  .  
    A third question is: given that the regulator can choose m (and t) optimally, does 
she want to set  0 f  , i.e., does outside money crowd out private money? Here the answer is: it 




  <0 when R is large at the optimal m, and so the socially optimal f is zero for large 
enough R  . On the other hand, we have seen that when R  is close to 1 the private market 
equilibrium approximates the first best, and so private money is more efficient than outside 
money. We can carry out a similar exercise for variations in c. If c is small the deadweight costs 
of taxation are small and so outside money is more efficient than private money; the socially 
optimal f will be close to zero. On the other hand, if c is large, then the maximum possible value 




1 In other words, a pure outside money economy will achieve very 
little trade, and private money by itself can do better. Thus, the optimal f is bigger than zero.  
                 In summary, private money and government money have different costs and benefits 
and hence are not perfect substitutes. Private money is costly because it crowds out productive 
investment. Government money is costly because it is backed by distortionary taxes that create 
deadweight losses.  
 
5.2 Case with private borrowing  
We now show that our result that some outside money is optimal ( 0 m  ) generalizes to the case 
of borrowing. In the presence of private borrowing (5.3) and (5.4) are replaced by  









and the equilibrium in the market for building services will be given by 







For these formula to apply we need  21 fm    . We then have   
                                             
1 This maximum value of m can be obtained from maximizing (5.2) with respect to t. 23 
 
 
(5.14)     
1
2 (2 ) d p fm           and             
11
24 () ( 2 ) b p fm f m      . 
 
We know that 
2 1
2
d p   , from which it follows that       
( 5 . 1 5 )                 2 f m    . 
Hence, total welfare is given by  
 
(5.16) 
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. 
 The planner will maximize (5.16) with respect to f and m (given that  adjusts to satisfy (5.15)). 





















f  , which we know to be the case from (4.3). Hence, it is optimal to set  0 m  .   
  Interestingly, the introduction of government money does not eliminate the role for bank 
lending. In fact, it is complementary to bank lending, as shown by equation (5.15). The reason is 
similar to the one highlighted in Section 4: With no notes in the system, the amount borrowed by 
doctors equals the purchasing power in the hands of builders, which in turn equals the revenue 
received by doctors for their services. But if the revenue equals the debt, it is not in the interest 
of the doctors to work, given that they have to exert costly effort. To have a functioning lending 
market, thus, we need either private or outside money. Lending multiplies the effect from the 
injection of money.    
 
5.3 Pigovian Taxation   
  So far we have only considered government money backed by a distortionary tax. In 
Section 3, however, we showed that the competitive equilibrium produced too much liquidity 24 
 
and that that government intervention could improve welfare. In this context it is natural to 
wonder whether a Pigovian tax on deposits can kill two birds with one stone: raise revenue to 
support more government money while decreasing the inefficiency associated with notification.  
  Surprisingly, the answer is that such a scheme will not work: the reason is that the tax 
will be raised at the same time deposits are made, worsening the constraint that agents face. 
Formally, let’s assume that the government can require that anybody who deposits at a bank 
chooses a particular f and pays a total tax t.
2We will show that the welfare maximizing t equals 
zero, i.e. the government does not want to impose any Pigovian tax.     
A deposit tax will be assessed only on the early buyers (according to our convention, the 
doctors) since these are the only ones who deposit wheat. The total amount of money that can be 
supported by the tax revenue is M=t . Since the government cannot tell who needs to buy first, 




.   
Thus, the doctors will enter the buying phase with an amount of liquidity equal to 
f tm   and the builders, who will be paid by the doctors that amount, will enter their buying 
phase with an amount 2 f tm  .  
The equilibrium in the doctors’ market requires that  












d p f  . 
The equilibrium in the builders’ market requires that  
 












b p ft f  . 
                                             
2 One way for the government to do this is for them to impose a 100% marginal tax on deposits above f .  25 
 










  , while the 











.  Thus, the planner’s problem is to 
maximize  












    
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subject to (5.18), (5.19) , and the doctors’ individual rationality constraint (a doctor must be 
willing to deposit in a bank and pay the tax rather than deposit nothing).  
 
Proposition 5: It is optimal for the government to set t equal to zero.  



























, which can 













 . The right hand side equals the left hand side at  0 t   and 















 when  1 f  . Thus, the l.h.s. is always 
as big as the r.h.s. and the welfare is maximized at   0 tm   .  
 
                   In most situations in which the social optimum differs from the competitive 
equilibrium, the social optimum can be implemented with a simple linear tax. Proposition 5 
implies that this is not the case. Even if an appropriate linear tax can restore the right incentive 
on the margin, it will be suboptimal, since it will raise revenues, worsening the constraints of 
doctors.  26 
 
The optimal level of deposits can be implemented with a nonlinear tax  0 t   if 
* f f  and tf   if
* f f  , since in equilibrium this tax will raise no revenues. Yet, this tax is 
very informational intensive. It requires the planner to know the optimal level of deposits for 
each individual. This is trivial in the model, since everybody is the same, but it is not in reality.  
  In reality, however, there are better ways to deal with this problem, which do not require 
so much information. Since what matters is the aggregate level of deposits, the planner can limit 
herself to controlling that instead. Even with multiple banks, she can do this by issuing a fixed 
number of permits and allowing banks to accept deposits only if they own the right amount of 
permits.  
This is exactly what central banks do with reserve requirements. The central bank 
requires each bank to deposit a fraction of its own deposits at the central bank. In this way a bank 
can accept a deposit only if it has enough deposits at the central bank. Thus, by controlling the 
level of its own deposits, a central bank can control the level of deposits in all the banks and (in 
this simple economy) the liquidity of the overall system.
3  
  
6 Extensions     
6.1 Banks investing in high return projects  
We have assumed that high return projects can be undertaken only by the agents and not by the 
banks. What would happen if the banks could undertake the high return projects too?   In this 
case each doctor would deposit all his endowment in the bank in exchange for shares in the 
bank’s assets (in proportion to his fraction of the total funds deposited). These shares would then 
be used for trading. The doctors would endorse these shares to the builders in exchange for 
building services and the builders would further endorse them to doctors when they buy their 
services. There is no longer a trade-off between unproductive investments that provide liquidity 
and productive investments that don’t. The first best can be achieved if agents invest all their 
endowment in the productive project as long as  1 eR  . 
            A similar conclusion is reached if only individuals can invest in productive projects as 
long as these projects can be collateralized, i.e., their returns fully pledged. 
                                             
3 This example applies to a situation of fiat money not of specie money, as in our model. However, even in a specie 
money economy central banks control the total amount of deposits with some fractional reserve.  27 
 
   We now show that these conclusions change if the high return projects are risky, highly 
correlated, and some uncertainty about  their returns is resolved before the two rounds of trading. 
In this case the value of the notes backed by risky investments is volatile. Although individual 
agents are risk neutral, the transactional role played by money makes them risk-averse vis-à-vis 
fluctuations in the value of notes.  
  Agents dislike the uncertainty about the value of their claims because if the value of their 
claims drops below 1, the economy operates below full potential, while if the value of the claims 
is above 1, no extra benefits are generated.  
  Let’s consider the case where banks can invest in the same projects as individuals. 
Suppose that each bank can choose how to divide its deposits between a risky project with an 
expected return of R  and a safe project, and this choice is perfectly contractible, so there is no 
moral hazard involved.  Let’s also assume that uncertainty about returns gets fully resolved 
before the first round of trading. Finally, we assume that the risky projects are perfectly 
correlated and have the following payoff per dollar (constant return to scale):  




   with probability   
               = 0          with probability 1-  
The expected return of the investment isR ,which exceeds 1. In this section we will focus on the 
limiting case where  0    and the investment becomes infinitely risky. 
  In this set up, since banks can commit to the mix of safe and risky investments, it is easy 
to show that doctors will deposit all their wheat e in the banks. (Builders will continue to invest 
in their own projects.) Thus, the crucial variable is the proportion   of deposits that a typical 
bank invests in the riskless asset (storage),where 1   is invested in the risky project. 
Since trading will take place with banks’ shares, the equilibrium prices will differ 
according to the state that is realized before the beginning of trading. Denote prices in the bad 
state by  d b p p ,  and in the good state by ,
g g
bd pp  .  
With probability 1    the risky investment will yield zero, the riskless asset one, and the 








 . In summary, if we let g be 
the value of the doctors’ claim, then   28 
 
     








in the good state 
                                           
2 ge  
   
in the bad state 
             
A doctor’s expected utility is  













  . 
 
From the analysis of Sections 3 and 4, 
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4 () b p e      
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If we keep  1    constant and let 0   , 
g










    
which is identical to (3.1) with  d ef   . Hence, all the solutions will be the same as in Section 3. 
Each (competitive) bank will choose   d ef   , where d f  solves (3.2) .Also as  0   the welfare 
function will become  
(6.4)      
1 1
4 2 11
() ( 1 )
22
db W U U e e e eR eR           
which is identical to (3.9) with  ef   . Thus we have  
 
Proposition 6.  When uncertainty is resolved before trading takes place, the model of this section 
with trading in bank shares is equivalent to the model of Section 3 with trading in fixed claims 
on deposits.  
                  The intuition is that in the good state of the world the economy has plenty of liquidity 
and so the Walrasian equilibrium is realized. Since this state occurs with negligible probability, 
however, the value of liquidity in this state is very small. Thus liquidity is provided by the safe 
investment, which pays off in the bad state. The risky investment still has value in expected 29 
 
terms but only because it provides a huge amount of extra wheat consumption in the good state. 
For these reasons banks will hold a mix of safe and risky investments, just as individual doctors 
do in the model of Section 3. In the limit the two models are equivalent. 
6.2 Non-competitive banks 
So far we have treated banks as purely passive institutions. In this subsection we explore 
how the results change once we allow banks to be of non-negligible size and to behave 
strategically.  We start with the conjecture that, as in the competitive case, the only agents who 
want to deposit are doctors. We will then verify this conjecture.  
Let us assume that there is a fixed number of banks,
1

, where 0< <1. Each bank serves 
a fraction  of the doctors. For simplicity we assume that each bank is a monopolist with respect 
to its constituency of doctors; however, we doubt that much would change if we allowed several 
banks to compete for the same constituency of doctors. 
Note that the case  =0 can be interpreted as the (limiting) situation where every doctor 
can set up his own bank. In what follows we will report the results only for mutual (or 
cooperative) banks.  Considering outside-owned banks will not ameliorate matters; in fact, it 
would make them worse.  
             We assume that each bank offers the doctors in its constituency the following service: a 
doctor can deposit an amount of wheat up to  and receive notes (or checks) equal to . Hence, 
 is a policy instrument of the bank, which is the same for all customers; moreover, we assume 
that the bank can announce and commit to it.
  
If  ˆ f   obtained in (3.8), then each doctor will set  ˆ f f  and the bank policy would be 
irrelevant. Hence, we focus on the possibility that  ˆ f   , where each doctor will deposit the full 
amount allowed,  . 
Consider a single bank’s choice of  given that the bank serves a fraction   of the 
population of doctors and that the average choice of other banks is 
. We know from Section 2.2 
that even if every doctor deposits as much as he wants, then  1 b p   and 1 d p  . A fortiori this 
must be true when  ˆ f   . Thus we can focus on situations where 1 b p   and 1 d p  .  
The doctor’s utility will be given by 
 30 
 









  . 
           The mutual bank chooses  to maximize the utility of a representative member, given by 
(6.5), taking into account the effect of the bank’s choice of  on prices b p  and d p .            
Let us consider this price effect. Given  the total value of notes in circulation will be 
(1 )     ; the first term represents the contribution of this bank and the second term the 
contribution of the other banks. Since doctors use all their notes on building services, the demand 
for building services is                      
(6.6)               
(1 )
b p
    
, 





. Equating these yields 
                
(6.7)          
2 (( 1 ) ) . bd p p        
 
In the market for doctors, demand is  
 
 (6.8)          
(1 )
d p
   
, 
since the builders use all the notes received from doctors to buy doctor services; and supply is 
d p . Combining this with (6.3) yields 
(6.9)          
3
4 (( 1 ) ) b p     
, 
   
1
2 (( 1 ) ) . d p       
Substituting into (6.2), we see that the utility of a representative doctor at the bank choosing is 
 (6.10)           3
4
1
(( 1 ) ) ( )
2





   


 .  
We study a Nash equilibrium in which each bank chooses   to maximize (6.10), taking 
 
as given. Let  (1 ) y     
 and  (1 ) z      . Then, maximizing (6.10) is equivalent to 
maximizing  31 
 











     
with respect to y. It is easy to see that (6.11) is strictly concave in y. Thus, there is a unique 
maximizer y and hence a unique maximizer of (6.10), given  
.  
             Moreover, the optimal y is strictly increasing in z. It follows that, if two different banks 
choose different values of sigma in equilibrium, i.e., they face different values of z, then they 
will choose different values of y. But y equals the average value of sigma over all banks, and 
must therefore be the same for each bank. It follows that the equilibrium sigma is the same for all 
banks, i.e., any Nash equilibrium is symmetric.  
  Differentiating (6.10) and setting   ˆ     , we may conclude that the equilibrium level of  
 ,   if 01   , satisfies  







  .  
Let’s now verify the conjecture that builders do not want to deposit any of their wheat. Define 
*
d   to be the solution of (6.12).This is the equilibrium level if and only if the builders do not 














  . 






Substituting the equilibrium level of 
1
*2
dd p   we have  
 

















As long as (6.13) is satisfied (which is certainly true for a big enoughR ), the solution determined 
by (6.12) is an equilibrium. As is easy to see, the level of R for which (6.13) is satisfied depends 
on  .  For  0   , (6.13) is satisfied for any  1 R  . For  0.25   , (6.13) is satisfied for  1.23. R   
Having established that (6.12) characterizes an equilibrium if (6.13) is satisfied, we can 
compare it with (3.10) to obtain:  
Proposition 7. In a competitive market ( close to 0) banks choose too high a level of deposits 
with respect to what is socially efficient. In a monopolistic market ( =1) banks choose too low 
a level of deposits with respect to what is socially efficient.    







 .  Since both (6.12) and (3.10) are decreasing in their 
arguments, to prove that the solution of (6.12) is smaller than the solution of (3.10) it is enough 
to show that 
31 33
42 44 11 1 1 3
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 , which is always true. 
The intuition for the competition result is as before. The intuition for the monopolist one 
is simple. Large mutual banks restrict , i.e., issue too few notes, to lower the price of building 
services; this helps their members since their members consume these services. In doing this, 
however, large banks ignore the positive externality they impose on builders, who gain from high 
prices since this allows them to buy more doctor services. Small banks choose a high  because 
their impact on prices is limited.  
When it comes to builders, they cannot create liquidity to increase the price of their own 
services; hence, they face a trade-off similar to before: increasing their own purchasing power at 
the expense of the return on their investments.    
  Since a competitive banking sector generates too much liquidity and a monopolistic one 
too little, by continuity there exists a level of oligopoly  that delivers the efficient level of 
private money. Note, however, that this level is contingent uponR ; thus if the level of R changes 
with the business cycle, so does the level of competition that delivers the first best. In other 
words, unless the government can somehow fine tune the level of competition over time, this 




7. Implications for the nature of money  
  What is money? In our model money is a relatively safe asset that overcomes a 
pledgeability problem in a world where labor income is contractible but not fully pledgeable, 
because workers can quit. The need for this relatively safe asset arises for transactional purposes. 
Transactional needs generate a form of risk aversion even in risk neutral people. When an agent 
has the opportunity/desire to buy, having twice as much pledgeable wealth in some states does 
not compensate her for the risk of having half as much in other states, because in the latter states 
she is wealth constrained. As a result, agents are willing to hold relatively safe assets even if they 
have a lower yield.   
In our model the cost of money is represented by its opportunity cost. Ideally, the best 
money is an asset that is valuable (in a fine horizon economy one needs a desirable asset to make 
the pledge credible) and whose opportunity cost is low. Before the introduction of fiat money, 
the main commodity that was used as money, gold, was not particularly useful per se. Hence, as 
noted by Sargent and Wallace (1983), the inefficiency of commodity money was not the 
distortion in the use of gold, but its overproduction.  
Sargent and Wallace (1983) seem to suggest that the introduction of fiat money 
eliminates this problem. In contrast, our model indicates that the partial non-pledgeability of 
future labor income creates an additional demand for relatively safe assets. Hence, too many 
resources are invested in manufacturing these relatively safe assets. An example of this 
overproduction is the huge expansion of the finance sector in the first decade of the new 
millennium, an expansion that cannot be explained by any of the traditional roles performed by 
finance (Philippon (2008)). While the production of AAA mortgage-backed securities might 
have been privately optimal, our model suggests that it was not necessarily socially optimal.           
 
8. Conclusions  
  We have built a simple framework to analyze the general equilibrium implications of the 
creation of liquidity by banks. To isolate these effects in this paper we consider either fully-
backed money or lines of credit secured by a certain income stream. As a result there is no risk of 
banks’ default. This risk is clearly a very important problem in reality, and we plan to consider it 
in future work.  34 
 
In a world where some assets can be collateralized and other assets cannot, our paper 
shows that the assets that can be collateralized will trade at a premium with respect to what their 
yield would imply. More surprisingly, our paper shows that the competitive equilibrium will lead 
to an excess of collateralizeable assets. This distortion is present even if we introduce lending 
and government money. The source of this distortion is a (pecuniary) externality that arises from 
the creation of money. More money increases the equilibrium price of goods purchased by the 
agents who are liquidity constrained (think, for example, of the effect of the relaxed credit on the 
price of U.S. houses). This externality has welfare effects, because the buyers are liquidity 
constrained.  The government can remove this distortion by imposing a tax on deposits or by 
restricting the creation of deposits through a reserve requirement. .  
Our model also shows that this effect can be attenuated or even eliminated in a less than 
competitive banking sector. Yet, we run the risk of the opposite problem: with too little 
competition we will have too little liquidity. Therefore, it is unlikely that restricting competition 
is the best way for the government to remove the externality that we have identified. It would be 
better for the government to tackle the problem by directly targeting the creation of liquidity. 
In our two period model, outside money is very costly because we compare its one period 
benefit with the deadweight cost of taxation necessary to support it. If the number of periods 
increases, the cost remains the same, but the benefits increase. In the limit, in an infinite horizon 
model, it may be possible to support outside money without any cost. Hence, outside money may 
be better able to reduce and possibly eliminate the inefficiency we have studied. We will 
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